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The Poetics of Place
--Lawrence Kimmel
Prefatory Remarks
Paul Ricoeur, at a Hannah Arendt retrospective some 15 years ago, spoke
of the controlling metaphor of Arendt's work as that of Place, and said that he
offered in his own work, instead, an enabling metaphor of Time. To bring
together the work of these two exceptional thinkers, to bridge the divide and to
map out the complementarity of engaging metaphors would be a worthy task of
scholarship, however I will not try to do so even in outline here. Still, the contrast
and convergence of the two metaphors of time and place is one I want to at least
sketch in this paper.
The conference itself, at New York University, was a tenuous and difficult
gathering of scholars who, for years, had been deeply divided over the import
and response of Arendt's "report" for the New Yorker, in a series of articles that
later was published as a book entitled Eichman in Jerusalem. Arendt’s report
covered the trial of the Nazi war criminal, a trial which itself engaged a present
political and judicial temperament with a spiritual and moral retrospective of
heinous policy acts within a bound time of terror and horror. That trial, among
other things, was an occasion for the remembrance of a time now revisited from
a profound and terminal place, the ancient and new homeland of Israel.
Whatever in Arendt’s work divided us, (the key to the fury in that
division, especially for the survivors, is captured in her subtitle “The banality of
evil”), the pathos of time, place and people, the critical importance of the
references of Time--the Holocaust, and of Place -- Dachau, Belsen, Auchwitz -was lost on no one. Not on survivor and witness, not on student, historian,
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philosopher, or poet. Neither Place nor Time was a welcome one to be shared-horror, however witnessable, is perhaps not shareable-- but these were
extraordinary times and places which, whether or not we claim them, have a
claim on us. They have become indelible places in the time of history which
resettled the boundary lines of the inconceivable in human action.
The history of the Jews leading up to this moment had been the story of a
people without a place, a people trying to survive, compete, achieve, or prevail
only in time, in transit. The proposal of the "final solution" was to further
deprive a people already without a place-- they were to be denied a time as well,
they were to disappear from the face of the earth. It is of course arguable that
there is nothing singular or new in this, that many peoples have been and
continue to be subjected to oppression, dispersion, extermination. The
argument, then, is that only the systematic efficiency of scale is new: a modern
industrial nation state whose leaders were committed to a political policy of
genocide. Arendt herself argued the existence of something else: a new and
insidious form of evil in the institutionalized thoughtlessness of bureaucratic
order, in which the systematic and wholesale murder of human beings becomes
an assigned task just like any other. “Banality” for Arendt did not lessen but
deepened the terrible force and face of evil. Also arguably, this policy and its
effect could not have taken place, at least in the way of ease and efficiency it did,
if the Jews had been a sovereign people of place. When Hitler argued for only "a
place in the sun" for Germany, it was important to ask, at whose expense of
place, as well as at what price of appropriation.
My interest here is not to trace the particulars of this, or of any time and
place. It is rather to see the essential human import of these two fundamental
and often conflicting categories of Time and Place.
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______________________

There is, in the life of a person and in the history of a people, a
convergence and integration of time and place, however tenuous, such that the
significance of meaningful time and place are requisite to the human character of
life. The denial of either diminishes or eliminates, fully or marginally, human life
and community.
We are familiar with the category of Place primarily through the discourse
of politics and economics. There, most often the accompanying analysis
proceeds under a negative rubric of displacement. The dispersion and
encroachment of political rhetoric on every form of discourse is now common
and often regrettable. That public political discourse, in turn, mimics the popular
rhetoric of placement in competitive sports and entertainment is no less
regrettable. Everything becomes a contest for place: laurels to the winner,
oblivion to the rest. It would be instructive here to trace the devolution of Place
in such cultural conversation, which, in becoming Fame degenerates into a
commodity for consumption on the evening news--a sound bite of time.
Ours is a time in culture-- especially in academic culture and the arts-when politics and poetics converge, for better or worse, e.g. in eristic and
logocentric disputes over logocentricity, gender disputes over gender, poetics,
and place, traditional squabbles over the displacement of the feminine and of
ethnic minorities from the tradition of "the canon”. Hopefully, the positive
political and poetic intention beneath the disputation is to make space and find
place for ethnic and engendered voices whose expression will provide genuine
and singularly different human perception and aspiration.
In an untimely fashion, however, I want to shift from the politics of place
to the poetics of place in traditional literature with no additional apology.
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Certainly among the categories of human placement is gender and ethnic
identity and the preclusion of those voices from continuing discourse is a form
of cultural genocide that is harmful to the whole of humanity, not just to the
victims. But just as in passing on the specifics of time and place of the Jewish
holocaust, neither will my focus here be on gender or ethnicity. For our limited
purposes the basic unit of analysis and concern for Place is still human being.
In an earlier companion essay, I cited Beckett's remark fromWaiting For
Godot , "She gives birth astride a grave" as a contemporary index of the pathos of
place, a stark expression of radical compression if not despairing constriction of
human time and place. Human life, conceived in terms of Beckett's distracting
glimpse, is a sudden cry snuffed out, a brief fall from womb to grave, cradle to
coffin. This is a throw-away line (about throw-away life) in a play about time
waiting. The two principal characters are creatures born of woman, presumably,
caught between something: womb and grave will do. Being born or dying, it
comes to the same thing. This play is marginally and literally just that, play--a
deadly expression of a sometime frantic divertissement , a pathetic delay comically
echoing Addie’s weary judgment in As I Lay Dying , that living is just getting
ready to stay dead a long time. The limbic snare in which the lost are
momentarily caught in Beckett’s works may be placenta or shroud for all it
matters; Tweedledum and Tweedledee, twins in time, only in time, going
nowhere, coming from nowhere, doing nothing, marking without filling time.
There is no anguish or suffering in this oblivion, no absurd or tormenting task
which characterized the pathos of absent border souls in the mythos of classic
literature. One can, for example, as easily imagine Estragon and Vladimir
casually and intermittently, without any conviction but complaining nonetheless,
filling a sieve with water. It is surely significant in this most contemporary of
dramas of the human spirit or lack thereof, that there is no defining place, nor
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even the memory of an insubstantial pageant faded, only a minimal prop a
useless rack left aside. On the suggestion of the text remark quoted, this drama
might be staged in a graveyard, a paupers-field, but even then, the hint of sacred
ground, or even wasted plots and overturned stones would lend gravity and
ground, and so betray the sense of Beckett’s drama as the complete absence of
Place.
Counterpoint and complementary to the visions of human life as
transitory being in time, is the traditional discourse of place, of human beings
grounded in the securing work and space of their own making. Arendt drew on
Aristotelian distinctions between the natural metabolism of life in Time as the
labor of our bodies,--Animal Laborans, only sustaining life, in contrast with the
cultural achievement of Place through the work of our hands --Homo Faber ,
maker of works and world. So conceived, Place becomes the essential defining
limit and bid for permanence of however brief sojourn of the human. Often in
fictive literature, apart from practical affairs, the sense of place is plaintive, a
melancholy remembrance of "home" that never was, of a promised land of milk
and honey, of acceptance, of rest. In that literature Place becomes anthologized
as a remembered arcade, a longed for asylum, a sacred cloister, a familiar hearth,
a cherished fatherland, a ruined shrine, a killing field, a camposantos ... distant
places of birthing and growing, loving and warring, learning and praying,
resting and dying --all activities which, if only considered in and as time,
evaporate into the air, traces only, which blow in the wind. Human activity is
only given presence and permanence in those places set aside to constitute,
enable, consecrate and commemorate the journey.
Ever against or in tension with the sculpted Place of works is unrelenting
metabolism of Time, of motion, change, decay, death. On an exclusive poetics of
Time, in which Time is the constituting value of human life--time as life, life as
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time-- history and culture as well become only time, not remembrance, blowing
dust, vacant images draining into an empty eternity. It is the tension created in
these two visions, in the collision and collusion of metaphors of Time and Place,
which accounts for the felt depth of tragic drama. Nietzsche's early analysis of
the birth and death of Greek tragic drama in terms of the conflicting but
complementary forces of the Dionysian and Apollinian is a parallel distinction to
what we are here calling Place and Time. Apollo represents and reflects an
Olympian Place, a projected permanence and possession of form which can
reflect and re-present; Dionysos, in contrast, is the dying god, caught in the
devouring turn of seasons, who spiritually embodies Time, who can only find
significance in the flux of eternal recurrence. Nietzsche’s point, of course, was
that tragic drama can work, is possible, only when reflection becomes embodied,
time re-presented within place. An art, a culture, can only flourish worshipping
at the temple of both gods.
In Greek tragedy hybris both creates and destroys the hero, who in
greatness of spirit aspires to a place reserved for the gods, comes to rival the
gods, and so must learn the painful lesson of that difference as an example to
human beings to keep their place in time. Even though, in the Greek conception
of things, men and gods are as one race, it is only the gods who are immortal,
whose place is outside of time. The denouement of tragic vision is the inevitable
fate of Dionysos. Tragic drama creates, stages, gives place to the time of the
dying god, who embodies the aspirations and destiny of man. The shared ritual
of this celebration marks the height and breadth of human reach, the sacrificial
celebration of the man-god, the lesser god whose place is in time and who must
die--condemned finally, for all her beauty and wit, as sacrificial flesh to the
devouring maw of time.
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In the contemporary world, in the continued absence of cultural
conviction --what Nietzsche called myth-- that would produce tragic vision and
tragic drama, there is a residual literature of existence, constrained to the selfconstituting metaphor of time, which proclaims a tragic vision and aspires to a
portrayal of the human condition.

“Existentialism”, in many of its articulations,

views human life as without essence, deprived of place, in which the whole
project of living is a crisis of the individual in time confronting nothingness. The
references are familiar enough. Sartre, who defines (authentic) existence as a
continual projection and pursuit of possibilities (the realization of a provisional
self in freedom) pictures suicide as the failure of a conception of a possible
project. With nothing to draw one through time into the future-- and in the
absence of grounding place-- then there is no will, no life, no motion.
Similarly, Camus, sad prophet of the absurd, in Le Mythe de Sisyphe,
places the question of the meaning of life in the context of the question of suicide:
in his view, this is what it means to take seriously the Socratic dictum that the
unexamined life is not worth living. He regards the metaphysics of place,
anything which would ground human thought or being, as simply alternative
forms of suicide. Camus’ variable depictions of the human condition mirrors
Beckett’s spare images, their occasions most often are vacuous, a series of
interactive happenings which depict (not define) the half lives of characters, who
are more ciphers for passing events than characters. Indeed, in portraying
Meursault, the anti-hero of L’Etranger , Camus seems intent on a moral
experiment, of exercising a fictional absurdity commensurate with the absurdity
of living. In Meursault we are given a character sketch of a being without
character-- a transient, a tourist, an alien, indeed a stranger most strange to
himself, except he has not much interest in the passing affair of his own life.
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This literary vision of the human condition common to Beckett, , Sartre.
Camus, and many others is, as I want to put it here, the attempt to do without
place, without ground. In Camus’ work this is specified as life without meaning,
which, he argues is not the same as life without value. To conclude that life is
meaningless is simply to declare no explanation is appropriate, and no place
determinate of the human in the flux of time. As a resolute moraliste , Camus
pleads that one still take up the worthy if thankless and unheroic tasks of crisis
as they emerge from the transient sewers of human settlement. (La Pest ) The
vision and imperative of the human condition in time is apparent: confront crisis.
Equally apparent is the irony of that confrontation, as Marlowe reminds us in
Conrad's The Heart of Darkness -- it is an unexciting contest, wrestling with death,
which takes place in an impalpable grayness, nothing under foot, no spectators
or glory, no great belief in one’s own cause and still less in that of the other-- as
well be a timely snickering footman, holding a hero's coat.
It is perhaps only the ironic sense of crisis which characterizes this
literature of displacement as modern. The sometimes concerted effort to set out
a space in which human life, for the moment of its expression, attains to
meaning, to a sense not of immortality but humanity, is itself not new.
World literature is full of memorable and well known poignant reference
to the brief transience of place, to the furtive and insecure impermanence of
hopeful stops along the way. It would be difficult to find better or more
troubling expressions for the human interstices of Time and Place than two
familiar literary indices of Hebraic and Hellenic cultures:
“As for man, his days are as grass. As a flower of the field, so he
flourisheth. For the wind passeth over it, and it is gone, and the place
thereof shall know it no more.” (Old Testament , Psalm 103)
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“As is the life of the leaves, so is that of men. The wind scatters the leaves
to the ground: the vigorous forest puts forth others, and they
spring season. Soon one generation of men comes and

grow in the
another ceases.”

(Iliad , Book VI)

Perhaps typically, one is a lament, the other an implicit solution, neither is
an expression of despair or spiritual nihilism. They clearly picture human life in
the flow of time and nature-- whether warrior or sage, in battle or in prayer-- as
without place of permanence, and ultimately without singular meaning or
significant identity except tenuous celebration and remembrance.
The literature which aspires to or has achieved historical remembrance in
the popular mind is similarly full of the recognition of the crucial if painful
conflict and convergence of these two central facts of human life and
consciousness: we are creatures of Place in Time, and that is the he and the she
of it. Consider any tragic soliloquy of Time in the work of Shakespeare-- in
which Tomorrows creep in petty pace to last syllables, brief candles blow, its
hour upon the stage, spirits melt into air, are such stuff as dreams are made of..;
but, at the same time and place in the genre of Shakespeare's work are hymns to
Place, to this Sceptred Isle, this Blessed Plot, this Turf, this Realm... One can start
and stop anywhere along the way ; “The Canon” is everywhere dense with such
convergence, where even the mind is its own place, where if a clod be washed
away, as it must and will, humankind is diminished.
I will end this essay on the time of place, the place of time in human life,
literature, and consciousness with two citations from Hemingway . His much
anthologized short story “A Clean Well Lighted Place” crystallizes a very
modern sense of individual vulnerability and fragile dignity, in some ways
parallel and in a counterpoint of irony to our citations from the Iliad and Psalms.
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In this familiar story the older bartender senses and defends the need of a
solitary, drinking old man for a public place, a clean place where one can appear
with some dignity, a place well lighted against the consuming darkness which
lurks beyond. This public place is no longer the polis where, in the exuberance of
morning light the youthful culture of the Greeks strove for excellence and
competed for honors, but neither is it rats alley, where the dead men lost their
bones. Less is expected here, less is required, less is needed. Somewhere along
the road of spiritual history there occurred a wrenching loose of the individual
from a sense of wholeness in community. In time of need we seek the light of a
minor sun, and a clean lighted place will do. In the force of this portrait of Place,
there is surely a reminder of the depth to which culture and consciousness has
fallen, and it is met with acknowledgment and the parody of a prayer to nada y
mas nada .
The final reference is to a passage in A Farewell to Arms , where again, in
time of raw need, the question is one of simple dignity, in which the imperative
of Place is not a calling to honor or immortality, nor is it saving, but still
essential, for all that:
“There were many words you could not stand to hear and finally only
the names of places had dignity...Abstract words such as glory, honor,
courage or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages..”
I expect it would be possible not only to mark cultural stages of
consciousness by reference to the conceptual resonance of time and place in
discourse, but also to trace a spiritual devolution of culture from the literature of
myth to religion to history to document to media. However we choose to tell the
story, what remains constant is the convergence of time and place. Finally it is
in the presence and products of sculpted space-- works of buildings, works of art,
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of law, of literature and science-- that time becomes more than process, it
becomes culture, it becomes world, it becomes human.
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